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COMMENTS
LOUSIANA CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VIII: EDUCATION
Education reform has been a much discussed topic in Louisiana
recently. New educational programs must comply with Louisiana Con-
stitution article VIII,1 which provides the framework for the state's
educational system. This comment will give a brief history of the pro-
visions of article VIII, outline the general structure of the educational
system mandated by those provisions, identify certain problem areas and
analyze some recent court decisions.
History and General Structure of the Louisiana Educational System
Article VIII, "Education," was the subject of much controversy
during the constitutional convention of 1973,2 consuming over fifteen
days of debate.' While disagreements arose concerning the goals of the
educational system, 4 the major conflicts concerned the structure of that
system.' The debates focused on the number and the kinds of agencies
that the constitution would recognize, as well as on the amount of
power each entity would have. Delegates struggled with decisions of
whether to give detailed constitutional protection to new or existing
institutions, such as the local school boards or college boards, or to
give the legislature more power over the educational system as a whole.
Much of the debate centered on past abuses, especially in the colleges
and universities. One such incident occurred in the 1930's, when the
president of Louisiana State University (L.S.U.) misappropriated funds
which were intended for use by the university. 6 This incident and other
similar abuses resulted in an amendment to the 1921 constitution that
created a Board of Supervisors to govern and control L.S.U.
7
Copyright 1986, by Louisana Law Review.
1. La. Const. art. VIII.
2. Carleton, Elitism Sustained: the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 54 Tul. L. Rev.
560, 577 (1980).
3. Louisiana Constitutional Convention Records Commission, Records of the Lou-
isiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts [hereinafter cited as
LCCRC]. Of particular interest are Vol. VIII and Vol. IX which contain transcripts of
the debates pertaining to article Vill.
4. LCCRC Vol. VIII at 2233.
5. Id. at 2240-72.
6. H.T. Kane, Louisiana Hayride, 379-85 (1941).
7. La. Const. 1921 art. 12, § 7.
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The most controversial area of article VIII, and perhaps of the
entire 1974 constitutional convention, was the creation of the various
educational boards. As a result of the controversy, two alternative
proposals were put before the voters of Louisiana.8 These proposals
were themselves the subject of several days of debate, and both rep-
resented compromises by the delegates. One alternative proposed two
policy-making boards-one board for elementary and secondary edu-
cation and one board for higher education-with a single superintendent
of education to coordinate and oversee both. The second alternative,
and the one selected by the voters, divided education into two major
areas of responsibility-elementary and secondary, and college-with
each area operating independently of the other. Although the con-
stitution provides for a yearly coordinating meeting between the two
supervising boards, no action is required so both areas are functionally
independent. The voters overwhelmingly vetoed the idea of an educa-
tional superboard, favoring instead greater decentralization. That the
voters made a clear choice in this regard may well be a basis for courts
to foster this policy of decentralization by construing the powers of the
Board of Regents narrowly and those of the management boards broadly.
The several sections of article VIII detail the structure of the ed-
ucational system and the powers of the various entities. At the elementary
and secondary level the state Board of Elementary and Secondary Ed-
ucation (hereinafter referred to as BESE) has general policy-making
control, while the State Superintendent of Education is in charge of
implementing those policies. Neither BESE nor the superintendent has
power to interfere with the day-to-day operations of the local school
boards. At the college level, three boards supervise and manage the
colleges and universities, with a Board of Regents to plan and coordinate.
Sections 2, 3, 9 and 10 of article VIII outline the specific structure
of the elementary and secondary system. Section 2 provides for the
Superintendent of Education to be the administrative head of the De-
partment of Education and to implement the policies of BESE. All
"other powers, functions, duties and responsibilities of the superintendent
shall be provided by law."' 0 Section 3 creates BESE to supervise and
control the public elementary schools and to have budgetary responsibility
for funds appropriated for those schools, "all as provided by law." ' '
This section also specifically denies BESE control over the "business
affairs" and selection and removal of employees of local school boards.
8. Carleton, supra note 2, at 578.
9. La. Const. art. VIII.
10. La. Const. art. VIII, § 2. The superintendent was originally an elected position,
but during the 1985 session the legislature exercised the option provided in the Constitution
to make it an appointed position.
II. La. Const. art. VIII, § 3.
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Section 9 provides for the creation of local school boards, 2 and section
10 recognizes those school boards that were in existence when the con-
stitution became effective. 3 Neither section 9 or 10 gives any specific
power to the school boards, each stating only that they are subject to
the control and supervision of BESE and the legislature. The common
thread running through these provisions is the phrase "as provided by
law," which the courts have interpreted as requiring the legislature to
delineate the exact powers, duties, and responsibilities of each branch
of the elementary and secondary system.'
4
Sections 5, 6 and 7 describe the structure of the college system.
Section 5 is a general introduction providing that the Board of Regents
"plan, coordinate and have budgetary responsibility for all public higher
education."' 5 The Board of Regents' specific responsibilities are the
revision, modification, and approval of degree programs; the formulation
of a master plan for higher education; the recommendation of any
necessary new institutions; and the submission of budget recommen-
dations for each institution. All management powers "not specifically
vested by [Section 5] in the Board of Regents are reserved to [the other
boards].' 6 Sections 6 and 7 provide for three management boards for
the various institutions-a Board of Supervisors for the L.S.U. system,
a Board of Supervisors for the Southern University system, and a Board
of Trustees for all the other colleges and universities. 7 Each board is
to have "supervision and management" powers over those institutions
under its control "subject to powers vested by [article VIII] in the Board
of Regents.""8 Similarly, the 1921 constitution, as amended in 1940,
'provided that L.S.U was under the "direction, control, supervision and
management" of the Board of Supervisors.' 9
These sections of article VIII of the 1974 constitution are self-
actuating and do not require legislation for implementation. The delegates
intended that the legislature's main function in regard to the universities
would be to apportion funds.20 The desire to take politics out of ed-
ucation and to avoid incidents such as the "Louisiana Hayride" scandals
of the 1930's was frequently mentioned by the delegates in their debates
regarding the amount and the kind of power that each board would
12. La. Const. art. ViII, § 9.
13. La. Const. art. VIII, § 10.
14. Hargrave, supra, note 4 at 442.
15. La. Const. art. VIII, § 5.
16. La. Const. art. ViII, § 5 (E).
17. La. Const. art. VIII, §§ 6 and 7.
18. La. Const. art. VIII, § 6.
19. La. Const. art. 12, § 17 (1940).
20. LCCRC, supra note 3, Vol. IX at 3283.
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have. 21 Since 1940, the L.S.U. system had been operated by an independent
board of supervisors, and the delegates considered that board's stability
and freedom from legislative control to be an advantage. 2  Past court
decisions emphasized that the board's management powers were broad
and far-reaching and that the amendment to the 1921 constitution which
created the board was designed to restrict legislative interference. 23 In
the 1973 convention, too, the delegates decided in favor of independent,
powerful boards. A proposed amendment, intended to give power to
the boards "as provided by law," was soundly defeated. 24 An additional
indication of the delegates' general distrust of legislative involvement is
the amount of detail in the provisions regarding higher education. The
delegates also tried to ensure the boards' future independence by stag-
gering the length of the appointments of board members, to make it
unlikely that a single governor would appoint an entire board.
Other sections of article VIII outline the goals of the educational
system, provide for funding by legislative appropriations and local taxes,
make available free school books and materials to all students, and
establish recognition of Tulane University as created in 1884.25
Litigation Involving Article VIII
Most of the litigation concerning article VIII has centered around
one or more of the structural sections. As with the debates during the
convention, the litigation has involved the amount and the kinds of
powers the various boards possess. Litigation involving elementary and
secondary education has been concentrated in three major areas-the
authority of the local school boards, the authority of BESE, and the
authority of the State Superintendent of Education. At the college level,
however, there has been considerably less litigation.
21. LCCRC, supra note 3, Vol. VIII at 2264, 2265. For an interesting discussion of
the scandals that plagued the college administration after Huey Long's term as governor,
see H.T. Kane, Louisiana Hayride, N.Y. 1941.
22. LCCRC, supra note 3, Vol VIII at 2264-65.
23. See Student Government Ass'n of L.S.U. v. Board of Supervisors of L.S.U., 262
La. 849, 264 So. 2d 916, (La. 1972) which stated that the intent of the constitution was
to grant exclusive administrative authority over operation of the university to the Board
of Supervisors. This includes regulating student parking on campus and on campus activity
of faculty, employees, and students. See also, Trice v. Reddoch, 273 So. 2d 894 (La.
App. Ist Cir. 1973) wherein the court declared La. R.S. 17:1803 an unconstitutional
infringement by the legislature on the Board of Supervisor's constitutional authority. The
statute provided a maximum fine for parking violations.
24. LCCRC, supra note 3, Vol. VIII at 2320.
25. La. Const. art. VIII, preamble, §§ 11-15.
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Authority of the School Boards
The authority of a school board to deny sabbatical leave has been
questioned in two cases. In Collins v. Orleans Parish School Board,2 6
a vocal music teacher with a Master's degree in music education planned
to take two courses while on sabbatical.27 The school board, however,
denied the requested leave because the courses would not "contribute
substantially to the teacher's ability to perform her present tasks nor
do they offer the promise of the kind of growth needed for the future
in her present assignment. ' 2 These two courses did not, according to
the school board, assure "mutual benefit." '29 The trial court upheld the
school board's decision, and the court of appeal affirmed. 0 The supreme
court, however, reversed the lower courts, ruling that a school board
is required to grant sabbatical leave when "sought for the purpose of
professional or cultural improvement."'" While refusing to decide if a
school board has any discretion to deny a sabbatical which a teacher
thinks would be helpful, the court ruled that in this case the board
"abused whatever discretion it might have had. 3 2 The court reasoned
that the language of the statute,33 which provides that a sabbatical "shall
be granted if the requirements are met," is mandatory; and because the
constitution did not specifically give any duties or powers to the school
boards, the language of the statute was controlling. 4 If the procedural
requirements of the statute are met, said the court, the school board
must grant the sabbatical.
In an earlier case, Shaw v. Caddo Parish School Board," the second
circuit upheld a school board's decision to terminate a sabbatical granted
to a principal who had accepted full time employment in an out of
state school during the period of the sabbatical. The court ruled that
since the sabbatical was obtained through misrepresentation, the school
board had the authority to terminate it. As in Collins, the court based
its decision on the text of the legislation, but in this case the court said
that the legislature intended to allow the local board to make this type
of decision.3 6
26. 373 So. 2d 1376 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
27. Id. at 1377.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1379.
31. 384 So. 2d 336, 338 (La. 1980).
32. Id. at 339.
33. La. R.S. 17:1171-1174 (1982 and Supp. 1986).
34. 384 So. 2d at 338.
35. 347 So. 2d 39 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977)
36. Id. at 43.
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Collins did not overrule Shaw since both decisions rested on -leg-
islative intent rather than on constitutional grounds. The Louisiana
Supreme Court in Collins clearly established that the local school boards
have little if any discretion in the area of sabbaticals and that the courts
probably will not allow a local school board to deny or terminate any
request for a sabbatical that meets the technical and procedural re-
quirements of the law, unless there is fraud or misrepresentation, or
the sabbatical is obviously not for the "purpose of professional or
cultural improvement" as required by the statute. 7
Both decisions are consistent with the idea that the constitution, in
its provision for legislative establishment of the school boards, and in
its failure to enumerate specific duties of the school boards, gives the
school boards power only indirectly. The legislature, through statutes,
activates the powers given the boards by the constitution, and thus
maintains the ultimate control over boards.
In St. John the Baptist Parish Association of Educators v. Brown38
the power of the school board was again narrowly defined when the
supreme court ruled that a parish school board has no authority to call
a referendum to determine the opinion of its electorate. 9 In this case
the school board had promised a union that it would call the referendum
as part of a settlement of a teacher's strike.' The court reasoned that,
while the legislature's authority to call a similar referendum emanates
from its sovereign power, any such power of a school board must be
created by a statute or the constitution.4 Finding no such express or
implied power, the court refused to allow the referendum. 42
In Johnson v. State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education 4
the supreme court indicated that the local school boards do have some
authority, when it held unconstitutional legislation which allowed BESE
to revoke teaching certificates for tenured teachers. 4" The court relied
on section 3 of article VIII, which specifically denies BESE control over
the selection or removal of school board employees. Since revocation
of a teaching certificate would be tantamount to a discharge, reasoned
the court, the legislature had violated the constitutional restriction on
BESE's power. 45 The court stopped short of saying that the school board
has inherent authority over the selection and the removal of its own
37. 384 So. 2d at 338.
38. 465 So. 2d 647 (La. 1985).
39. Id. at 675.
40. Id. at 677.
41. Id. at 675.
42. Id. at 677.
43. 414 So. 2d 352 (La. 1982).
44. Id. at 355.
45. Id. at 354.
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employees, only stating that BESE could not have authority in this area.
From the court's opinion, it appears that legislation which directly
establishes criteria for removing teachers would likely be upheld, as
article VIII does not designate any such power for the school boards,
and legislation is necessary to give them the power. Thus, while the
legislature cannot authorize BESE to revoke teaching certificates, it may
otherwise establish grounds for such action by statute.
Authority of BESE
As with the school boards, the courts generally have defined the
powers of BESE narrowly, reasoning that without statutory authoriza-
tion, BESE is powerless since the constitution grants it no powers
directly, but only "as provided by law."
In the first challenge to BESE's power, State Board of Elementary
and Secondary Education v. Nix," the Louisiana Supreme Court denied
BESE's assertion of direct control of its funds, holding that the legis-
lature has the power to channel all of BESE's funds through the office
of the state superintendent of education, and that legislative allocation
of functions between BESE and the superintendent does not violate the
constitution. 47 The court relied on the intent of the delegates to the
constitutional convention to divide the responsibility of education be-
tween BESE and the superintendent through legislative grants of power.
The textual support for this decision was in section 3, which states
that BESE "shall supervise and control the public elementary and sec-
ondary schools . . . and shall have budgetary responsibility ... all as
provided by law." '48 Justice Tate, writing for the majority, found the
phrase "as provided by law" to be key to the legislature's ultimate
decision-making ability in this case, but stated that the legislature could
not deprive BESE of "its constitutional policy-making duties and
powers." '49 Actually, this latter assertion was only dicta because the court
held that the legislature had not usurped BESE's power. Justice Tate
probably meant that the legislature could not allocate BESE's policy-
making power to the superintendent or to the local school boards;
nevertheless, the courts have consistently held that legislative policy
decisions do not violate the constitution, at least in the area of elementary
and secondary education.
46, 347 So. 2d 147 (La. 1977).
47. Id. at 152.
48. La. Const. art. VIII, § 3.
49. 347 So. 2d. at 153.
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In Aguillard v. Treen ° the supreme court, consistent with its rea-
soning in Nix, refused to overturn Louisiana's Creationism Act.5' The
act provides that schools must teach creation science whenever evolution
is taught. The court upheld the act on the narrow ground that the
legislature has the absolute power to prescribe a course of study.52 Again,
the court noted that BESE has no power without a legislative grant of
authority." Because in this case the court upheld what was clearly a
"policy-making" decision by the legislature, Justice Tate's dicta about
BESE's constitutional policy-making power must not refer to legislative
policy-making, but to policy-making by the local school boards or the
state superintendent of education. Thus, the legislature can make policy
in the area of elementary or secondary education, or it can delegate
those decisions to BESE. Nevertheless, state educational policies may
not be decided by any other agency. For example, a local school board
probably could not decide on its own to adopt text books not approved
by BESE. This reasoning would require that a court confronted with a
direct conflict between BESE and a local school board define "policy-
making". On the other hand, the past decisions make it clear that
legislation will be given great deference. Consequently, any statute al-
locating decisional power to the local school boards, rather than to
BESE, would probably be upheld unless it was clear that state-wide
uniformity is required in that particular area.
Authority of the State Superintendent of Education
The courts have also consistently defined the constitutional power
of the superintendent narrowly, reasoning that without a legislative grant
of authority, the superintendent has no power. The text of section 2,
however, does not entirely support this reasoning as it states that the
superintendent "shall implement the policies of the State Board of
Elementary and Secondary Education and the laws affecting schools
under its jurisdiction. The qualifications and other powers, functions,
duties, and responsibilities of the superintendent shall be provided by
law."15 4 Thus, although the superintendent appears to have a certain core
of self-actuating power, the constitution permits the legislature some
discretion in this area, :and the courts generally give the legislature broad
discretion in implementing the provisions of the constitution. In BESE
50. 440 So. 2d 704 (La. 1983).
51. La. R.S. 17:286.1-:286.7 (1982) contains the "Balanced Treatment for Creation-
Science and Evolution-Science Act."
52. 440 So. 2d at 710.
53. Id. at 707, 708.
54. La. Const. art. Viii, § 2 (emphasis added).
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v. Nix," for instance, the court upheld legislation allocating duties
between BESE and the Superintendent.
In Faul v. Superintendent, 6 the court ruled that the legislature has
the power to permit parents to petition for a French program in the
schools and to require funding for such a program from the budget of
the State Department of Education."' The superintendent was allowed
no discretion, but was expected to implement the policies of the leg-
islature just as it implements the policies of BESE. This duty is obviously
necessary in light of the decisions allowing the legislature to set edu-
cational policies, because that legislative power would be meaningless if
the superintendent were not required to implement those policies. In
addition, the language of section 2 requiring the superintendent to "im-
plement the policies of [BESE] and the laws affecting schools under its
jurisdiction," ' clearly implies the legislature's power to determine policies
and to force the superintendent to implement them with the funds
allocated to the Department of Education.
Thus, in the area of elementary and secondary education it appears
that legislation will be upheld unless its effect is to increase, rather than
to limit, the constitutional powers given to the various agencies. The
legislature has broad discretion both in setting educational policies and
in defining and limiting the powers of BESE, the superintendent, and
the local school boards. Nevertheless, the legislature cannot add to or
change the division of power between the bodies; it must keep intact
the constitutionally mandated structure. Over three-fourths of the leg-
islation affecting education is in the area of elementary and secondary
education, which suggests that the legislature is taking very seriously its
mandate to provide for public education through the constitutional struc-
ture. Challenges can be expected, but the jurisprudence indicates that
virtually all legislation in this area will be upheld as a constitutional
exercise of legislative power.
Higher Education
There has been much less litigation in the area of post-secondary
education, perhaps because the constitution more specifically delineates
the powers of the higher education boards. Also, there has been relatively
little legislation in this area, which indicates a realization by the legis-
lature that it was intended to have a much more limited role with respect
to college education.19 Because of the dearth of legislation, fewer court
55. 347 So. 2d 147 (La. 1977).
56. 367 So. 2d 1267 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
57. Id. at 1274.
58. La. Const. art. VIII, § 2.
59. Only about one-eighth of the revised statutes on education deal with higher
education.
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challenges would be expected. In fact, since 1974 there have been only
two cases dealing specifically with higher education.
Grace v. Board of Trustees for State Colleges and Universities60
involved a challenge to the Board of Trustee's authority to control the
resolution of faculty grievances. The court upheld the board's power in
this area, stating that the constitution granted "unqualified and exclusive
powers of supervision and management to that board, as to the uni-
versities under its jurisdiction. " 6 The court found that the 1974 con-
stitution increased the authority of the Board of Trustees, and, quoting
from State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education v. Nix,62
stated that, unlike BESE and the local school boards, the Board of
Trustees has constitutional powers that are "self-executing (i.e. enforce-
able without supplementary legislation) and exclusive administrative au-
thority over the institutions of learning within [its] jurisdiction. ' 63 In
addition, the court declared that in matters of supervision and man-
agement, the 1974 constitution removed the Board of Trustees from
the "restraints of legislative control."6
Although certain legislation provided for hearings to resolve griev-
ances of other state employees, the court refused to extend this legislation
to cover the school faculty, reasoning that the Board of Trustees has
full control over faculty grievances. This case suggests that any legislation
affecting higher education will be narrowly construed and may even be
declared unconstitutional if it conflicts with a decision of the college
boards. This implication is consistent with the delegates' intent that the
boards be free from legislative control and be allowed to operate in-
dependently.
The only case to reach the appellate level involving a head-to-head
confrontation between the Board of Regents and one of the lower boards
is Board of Regents v. Board of Trustees, 6 which involved a challenge
to the authority of the Board of Trustees to change the name of one
of the institutions under its jurisdiction. In April of 1984, the Board
of Trustees changed the name of the University of Southwestern Lou-
isiana to the University of Louisiana. 66 The Board of Regents challenged
this action, and a permanent injunction declaring the name change to
be null was issued in May, 1984.67 The injunction was appealed, but
60. 442 So. 2d 598 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1983), writ denied, 444 So. 2d 1225 (La.
1984).
61. Id. at 600.
62. 347 So. 2d 147 (La. 1977).
63. 442 So. 2d at 600.
64. Id.
65. 460 So. 2d 80 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
66. Id. at 81.
67. Id.
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before the appeal was heard, the legislature passed Act 656 which
provides that only the Board of Regents has the power to change
the name of a state institution of higher learning, and then only with
the approval of the legislature. 6 The Board of Regents then moved to
dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the statute made the issue moot.
The court refused to dismiss, reasoning that the statute may be uncon-
stitutional if it purports to remove powers that are specifically granted
by the constitution. 69
The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal recently affirmed the
trial court decision. 70 In a brief discussion of the issues the court ruled
that only the legislature could change the name of a university since
the constitution did not give the power to any board. The appellate court
rejected the Board of Trustees' argument that a name change is a
management decision and accepted the Board of Regents argument that
"the power of institutional naming is a matter of public policy, not
internal management.""'
While no cases delineate the specific powers of the different boards,
the court of appeal could have looked to several sources for guidance.
The text of the 1974 constitution, past legislation, and the intent of the
delegates of the constitutional convention provide some insight. The
constitution gives five specific powers to the Board of Regents and "all
remaining Management and Supervision" powers to the lower boards.7 2
Section 5(D) of article VIII states that the Board of Regents shall revise,
modify, or approve degree programs; formulate a master plan for ed-
ucation; recommend any necessary new institutions; and submit budgets
for all institutions to the legislature. Section 5(E) specifically reserves
all management powers to the lower boards. Unless the name of a
university is an essential part of the master plan for education, the text
of the constitution does not support the Board of Regent's authority
to change such a name.
Past legislation does not indicate that the legislature considers that
determining a college name to be solely a legislative function, as the
legislature has not chosen to name all the state colleges and universities.
In fact, while the act that created Louisiana State University at Shreveport"3
does name the school, the act that created Louisiana State University
at Eunice 4 does not give the school a name or even suggest how it will
68. La. R.S. 17:3217 (Supp. 1986).
69. 460 So. 2d at 82.
70. 491 So. 2d 399 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1986).
71. Id. at 401.
72. La. Const. art. VIII, § 5 (D), (E).
73. La. R.S. 17:1511 (1982).
74. La. R.S. 17:1521 (1982).
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be named. The same was true of several junior colleges. 7 In addition,
the name of the Louisiana State University at New Orleans was changed
to the "University o f New Orleans" without legislative input. This
indicates that the legislature does not consider a college name to be
within its sole discretion, but does not settle the issue of who has the
ultimate power to choose a name in case of a conflict.
In Louisiana Revised Statute 14:3552 the legislature purports to
delineate the functions of the Board of Trustees. 76 Although this statute
would not be binding: on the courts because the constitution mandates
the powers of the board, it does provide further insight into the legislative
view of the powers of the Board of Trustees. Powers such as making
contracts, setting fees, determining courses, and buying and selling land
suggest management authority more significant than the routine day-to-
day operation of a university. 7
Transcripts of the constitutional convention also contain guidance
in interpreting the constitution. The delegates likened the relationship
between the Board of Regents and the lower boards to that of BESE
and the local school boards. 78 No one would seriously suggest that only
BESE has the power to name or re-name an elementary school or a
high school. This is routinely done by school boards across the state.
If the university boards have as much authority as the local school
boards, the ultimate power is with the lower boards. One can argue,
however, that the name of a school of higher learning is much more
important than that of a high school. A university has a much wider,
possibly even national, scope of recognition, and one can argue that
because of possible confusion, only a central body should select the
name of a university. Presumably, however, the body selecting a name
will do so with an eye toward national exposure.
One might also argue, as the Board of Regents has, that the name
of the school sets the tone of the school and is actually a part of the
overall goal of the school. The Board of Regents argued that the colleges
and universities under the Board of Trustees are local institutions and
that the name should reflect this regionalization. This argument is flawed,
however, as many of the other universities do not have a name reflective
of regionalization. Louisiana Tech University, McNeese State University
and Nichols State University are examples. In addition, the University
of New Orleans, which is part of the L.S.U system, has a name that
reflects a local ratherithan a state orientation. Thus, the argument that
the L.S.U schools are state oriented and that the other schools are
locally and regionally oriented is unfounded.
75. La. R.S. 17:1531 (1982).
76. La. R.S. 17:3552 (1982).
77. Id.
78. LCCRC, supra note 3, Vol. VIII at 2319.
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It is the process of naming the state's colleges and universities,
rather than the wisdom of a particular name, that is at issue in Board
of Regents. The fact that the an institution's name is a matter of "public
policy" does not necessarily mean that only the legislature can choose
it, for the constitution gives the boards authority over many matters of
"public policy," including the formation of the state's master plan for
education. The Board of Regents, the lower boards, and the legislature
are all to a certain extent political bodies, and ultimately, all three
entities have to answer to the people of the state. That the voters chose
to remove the colleges and universities from the direct control of the
legislature in an effort to remove politics from higher education might
help the supreme court in deciding the name change issue in Board of
Regents.
Conclusion
As the jurisprudence illustrates, the powers of the lower education
boards differ significantly from those of the higher education boards.
This difference is not as much due to the goals of the constitution as
it is to the method of implementing those goals. The delegates chose
to give the legislature much greater input in the area of elementary and
secondary education. This decision is reflected in the inclusion in each
section of the constitution dealing with elementary and secondary ed-
ucation of the provision that the agencies may act only "as provided
by law." The constitution attempts to guide the legislature in defining
the specific powers of each agency, but does not prevent the legislature
from exercising power itself.
With respect to higher education, the constitution makes no mention
of legislation or of powers "as provided by law." The courts have
realized that the higher education boards have significantly greater free-
dom from legislative interference and, indeed, that this freedom is one
of the main thrusts of the constitutional provisions on education.
The jurisprudence also indicates that legislation affecting elementary
or secondary education will usually be upheld on constitutional grounds
unless the legislature affirmatively changes the power structure that the
constitution mandates. Also, challenges to the agencies probably will be
decided on legislative, rather than constitutional grounds. That is, courts
will look to see if there is legislation that could grant the power to the
agencies and will then look to the intent of that legislation. Again, only
a clear attempt by the legislature to have one agency usurp the con-
stitutional power of another agency will be invalidated.
The end result of possible conflicts between the legislature and the
boards connected with higher education is not so clear, although the
courts have indicated that the legislature has far less power to affect
college education. Indeed, a narrow construction of legislative power is
19861 1149
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consistent with the intent of the 1974 constitution. Unless the courts
interpret the boards' powers broadly, the freedom from legislative control
that the delegates and the voters envisioned will not come about.
Frances Moran Bouillion
